[squid-users] [ADVISORY] SQUID-2013:2 Buffer overflow in HTTP request handling

__________________________________________________________________

       Squid Proxy Cache Security Update Advisory SQUID-2013:2
__________________________________________________________________

Advisory ID: SQUID-2013:2
Date: July 11, 2013
Summary: Buffer overflow in HTTP request handling
Affected versions: Squid 3.2 -> 3.2.11,
                         Squid 3.3 -> 3.3.6
Fixed in version: Squid 3.2.12, 3.3.7
__________________________________________________________________

      http://www.squid-cache.org/Advisories/SQUID-2013_2.txt
__________________________________________________________________

Problem Description:

  Due to incorrect data validation Squid is vulnerable to a buffer
  overflow attack when processing specially crafted HTTP requests.

__________________________________________________________________

Severity:

  This problem allows any trusted client or client script who can
  generate HTTP requests to trigger a buffer overflow in Squid,
  resulting in a termination of the Squid service.

__________________________________________________________________

Updated Packages:

  This bug is fixed by Squid versions 3.2.12 and 3.3.7.

  In addition, patches addressing the underlying problem for all
  Squid versions can be found inour patch archives.

Squid 3.0:
  http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v3/3.0/changesets/squid-3.0-9200.patch

Squid 3.1:
  http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v3/3.1/changesets/squid-3.1-10487.patch

Squid 3.2:
  http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v3/3.2/changesets/squid-3.2-11823.patch

Squid 3.3:
  http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v3/3.3/changesets/squid-3.3-12587.patch

  If you are using a prepackaged version of Squid then please refer
  to the package vendor for availability information on updated
  packages.

__________________________________________________________________

Determining if your version is vulnerable:

  All Squid-3.1 and older versions, including Squid-2.x are not
  vulnerable.

  All unpatched Squid-3.2 versions up to and including 3.2.11 with
  'intercept' or 'tproxy' option set on a http_port or https_port
  line in their squid.conf are vulnerable.

  All unpatched Squid-3.2 versions up to and including 3.2.11 with
  'host_verify_strict' option set to ON intheir squid.conf are
  vulnerable.

  All unpatched Squid-3.3 versions up to and including 3.3.6 with
  'intercept' or 'tproxy' option set on a http_port or https_port
  line in their squid.conf are vulnerable.

  All unpatched Squid-3.3 versions up to and including 3.3.6 with
  'host_verify_strict' option set to ON intheir squid.conf are
  vulnerable.

__________________________________________________________________

Workarounds:

  There are no workarounds for this issue when intercepting traffic
  with NAT or TPROXY.Use of transparent auto-configuration via
  WPAD and/or PAC isrecommended practice instead of interception.

  If the vulnerability is due to use of the host_verify_strict
  directive in squid.conf. Removing it or setting it to OFF (the
  default) will remove the vulnerability for reverse-proxy and
  forward-proxy traffic. Any intercepted traffic will remain
  vulnerable.

__________________________________________________________________

Contact details for the Squid project:

  For installation / upgrade support on binary packaged versions
  of Squid: Your first point of contact should be your binary
  package vendor.

  If your install and build Squid from the original Squid sources
  then the squid-users_at_squid-cache.org mailing list is your primary
  support point. For subscription details see
  <http://www.squid-cache.org/Support/mailing-lists.html>.

  For reporting of non-security bugs in the latest STABLE release
  the squid bugzilla database should be used
  <http://bugs.squid-cache.org/>.

  For reporting of security sensitive bugs send an email to the
  squid-bugs_at_squid-cache.org mailing list. It's a closed list
  (though anyone can post) and security related bug reports are
  treated in confidence until the impact has been established.

__________________________________________________________________

Credits:

  The vulnerability was reported and fix provided by Nathan Hoad,
Netbox Blue Pty Ltd

__________________________________________________________________

Revision history:

  2013-07-10 03:25 GMT Initial Report
  2013-07-10 18:45 GMT Patches Released
__________________________________________________________________
END
Received on Thu Jul 11 2013 - 06:33:12 MDT